So
Senator, please explain to me as to why all the “security”
assessments and their recommendations performed against the World
Trade Center through-out the 1990s (whilst
at the same time Turner
Construction and SAIC
performed the WTC
Upgrades) complex where not implemented.
In
sum, I would affirm in this case because the Port Authority's failure
to implement discrete and basic security measures in the public parking area of the
commercial building complex arose from the exercise of its
proprietary -- rather than governmental – obligations
A
property risk assessment report is prepared for
Silverstein Properties before it acquires the lease for the World
Trade Center (see
July 24, 2001). It identifies the scenario of an aircraft
hitting one of the WTC towers as one of the “maximum foreseeable
losses.” The report says, “This scenario is within the realm of
the possible, but highly unlikely.” Further details of the
assessment, such as who prepared it, are unreported. [National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 5/2003, pp. 16 ; Barrett and
Collins, 2006, pp. 189; American Prospect, 9/1/2006]
Detective
Sergeant Peter Caram, the head of the New York Port Authority’s
Terrorist Intelligence Unit, has been directed by the assistant
superintendent of the Port Authority Police Department to compile a
report on the vulnerability of the WTC to a terrorist attack. Having
previously worked at the WTC Command, Caram has exclusive knowledge
of some of the center’s security weaknesses. On this day he issues
his four-page report, titled “Terrorist Threat and Targeting
Assessment: World Trade Center.” It looks at the reasoning behind
why the WTC might be singled out for attack, and identifies three
areas of particular vulnerability: the perimeter of the WTC complex,
the truck dock entrance, and the subgrade area (the lower floors
below ground level). Caram specifically mentions that terrorists
could use a car bomb in the subgrade area—a situation similar to
what occurs in the 1993 bombing (see February 26, 1993). [Caram,
2001, pp. 5, 84-85; New York County Supreme Court, 1/20/2004] This is
the first of several reports during the 1980s, identifying the WTC as
a potential terrorist target.
The
Office of Special Planning (OSP), a unit set up by the New York Port
Authority to assess the security of its facilities against terrorist
attacks (see Early 1984), spends four to six months studying the
World Trade Center. It examines the center’s design through looking
at photographs, blueprints, and plans. It brings in experts such as
the builders of the center, plus experts in sabotage and explosives,
and has them walk through the WTC to identify any areas of
vulnerability. According to New York Times reporters James Glanz and
Eric Lipton, when Edward O’Sullivan, head of the OSP, looks at WTC
security, he finds “one vulnerability after another. Explosive
charges could be placed at key locations in the power system.
Chemical or biological agents could be dropped into the coolant
system. The Hudson River water intake could be blown up. Someone
might even try to infiltrate the large and vulnerable subterranean
realms of the World Trade Center site.” In particular, “There was
no control at all over access to the underground, two-thousand-car
parking garage.” However, O’Sullivan consults “one of the trade
center’s original structural engineers, Les Robertson, on whether
the towers would collapse because of a bomb or a collision with a
slow-moving airplane.” He is told there is “little likelihood of
a collapse no matter how the building was attacked.” [Glanz and
Lipton, 2004, pp. 227; New York County Supreme Court, 1/20/2004] The
OSP will issue its report called “Counter-Terrorism Perspectives:
The World Trade Center” late in 1985 (see November 1985)
While
the Office of Special Planning is still working on its report about
the vulnerability of the World Trade Center to terrorist attack, the
New York Port Authority hired security consultant Charles Schnabolk
to also review the center’s security systems. [UExpress (.com),
10/12/2001; New York County Supreme Court, 1/20/2004] Schnabolk was
involved in designing the original security system when the WTC
complex was built. [Institute for Design Professionals, 2009; The
Security Design Group, 2010] This month his secret report, titled
“Terrorism Threat Perspective and Proposed Response for the World
Trade Center” is released. It sets out four levels of possible
terrorism against the center, and gives examples of each: ”(1)
PREDICTABLE—Bomb threats; (2) PROBABLE—Bombing attempts, computer
crime; (3) POSSIBLE—Hostage taking; (4) CATASTROPHIC—Aerial
bombing, chemical agents in water supply or air conditioning (caused
by agents of a foreign government or a programmed suicide).”
Similar to other reports in the mid-1980s, it also warns that the WTC
“is highly vulnerable through the parking lot.” [UExpress (.com),
10/12/2001; New York County Supreme Court, 1/20/2004]
After
assessing the security of New York Port Authority facilities, the
Office of Special Planning (OSP), the Port Authority’s own
anti-terrorists task force, releases a report called
“Counter-Terrorism Perspectives: The World Trade Center.” For
security purposes, only seven copies are made, being hand-delivered
and signed for by its various recipients, including the executive
director of the Port Authority, the superintendent of the Port
Authority Police, and the director of the World Trade Department.
[New York Court of Appeals, 2/16/1999; Village Voice, 1/5/2000]
Because of the WTC’s visibility, symbolic value, and it being
immediately recognizable to people from around the world, the report
concludes that the center is a “most attractive terrorist target.”
[New York County Supreme Court, 1/20/2004] The report, which is 120
pages long, lists various possible methods of attacking the center.
[New York Court of Appeals, 2/16/1999; Caram, 2001, pp. 103; Barrett
and Collins, 2006, pp. 87] One of these is that a “time bomb-laden
vehicle could be driven into the WTC and parked in the public parking
area.… At a predetermined time, the bomb could be exploded in the
basement.” [Glanz and Lipton, 2004, pp. 227] As a Senate Committee
Report will find in August 1993, “The specifics of the February 26,
1993 bombing at the World Trade Center garage were almost identical
to those envisioned in the [OSP] report.” [New York Court of
Appeals, 2/16/1999] Due to the Port Authority’s failure to
adequately implement the OSP’s recommendations, the report will be
crucial evidence in a successful civil trial against it in October
2005, charging negligence in failing to prevent the 1993 bombing.
[Bloomberg, 10/26/2005; New York Times, 10/27/2005; New York Times,
2/18/2006] As of mid-2006, the other possible methods of attacking
the WTC listed in the report remain undisclosed.
Following
the release of the Office of Special Planning’s (OSP) report, which
called the WTC a “most attractive terrorist target” (see November
1985), the New York Port Authority, which owns the center, seeks a
second opinion on the OSP’s recommendations. At a cost of
approximately $100,000, it hires the Science Applications
International Corporation (SAIC) to review the general security of
the WTC. SAIC states in its report that the attractiveness of the
WTC’s public areas to terrorists is “very high.” Like the OSP,
SAIC pays particular attention to the underground levels of the
center and describes a possible attack scenario much like what occurs
in the 1993 bombing. [Caram, 2001, pp. 105-106; New York County
Supreme Court, 1/20/2004]
During
the mid-1980s, a series of reports described the vulnerability of the
World Trade Center to terrorist attack (see July 1985)(see November
1985)(see (Mid-1986)). Now, because of the increased risk of
terrorism against the US due to the Gulf War, the New York Port
Authority hires private security company Burns and Roe Securacom to
prepare a further report, and tells them that the WTC is a terrorist
target. Unlike previous investigators, Burns and Roe Securacom finds
that the center’s shopping and pedestrian areas, rather than the
underground parking garage, are the most likely targets. [New York
County Supreme Court, 1/20/2004; New York Times, 10/27/2005] After
separating from Burns and Roe, Securacom (later called Stratesec)
will become one of a number of firms involved in providing security
at the WTC, right up to the day of 9/11
Following
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing (see February 26, 1993), the New
York Port Authority asks investigative and security consulting firm
Kroll Associates to help design new security measures for the WTC.
Kroll’s Deputy Chairman Brian Michael Jenkins leads the analysis of
future terrorist threats and how they might be addressed. Assessments
conclude that a second terrorist attack against the WTC is probable.
Although it is considered unlikely, the possibility of terrorists
deliberately flying a plane into the WTC towers is included in the
range of possible threats.
In
sum, I would affirm in this case because the Port Authority's failure
to implement discrete and basic security measures in the public
parking area of the commercial building complex arose from the
exercise of its proprietary -- rather than governmental --
obligations.
Rick
Rescorla, a Vietnam veteran who also previously worked for British
intelligence, is vice president for security at Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter and has an office in the south WTC tower. Following the 1993
bombing, he believes terrorists will attack the WTC again, this time
by flying a cargo plane, maybe loaded with biological or chemical
weapons, into it. Fred McBee, a close friend of his, will later say,
“He assumed that it would be the terrorists’ mission to bring the
Trade Center down.” Rescorla therefore wants his company to leave
the WTC and relocate to New Jersey, but their lease doesn’t expire
until 2006.
Previously,
he had predicted an attack much like the 1993 bombing: Around 1990,
along with friend and ex-special forces soldier Dan Hill, he had done
a security survey of the WTC and concluded that the biggest threat to
it was an underground truck bomb. He had met with New York Port
Authority security officials about this, but, according to Hill, was
told it was none of his business. Rescorla will be in his office on
the 44th floor of the South Tower at the time of the first attack on
9/11, and immediately order and supervise a successful evacuation of
almost all of Morgan Stanley’s 2,700 workers from the building.
Unfortunately, he will himself die when the tower collapses.
A
security company called Stratesec acquires an $8.3 million contract
to help provide security at the World Trade Center. It is one of
numerous contractors hired in the upgrade of security at the WTC
following the 1993 bombing. Stratesec, which was formerly called
Securacom, is responsible for installing the “security-description
plan”—the layout of the electronic security system—at the World
Trade Center. It has a “completion contract” to provide some of
the center’s security “up to the day the buildings fell down,”
according to Barry McDaniel, its CEO.
Involved
with Airport Security - Another of Stratesec’s biggest security
contracts, between 1995 and 1998,
is with the Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority, providing
electronic security for Reagan National Airport and Dulles
International Airport. Its work includes maintaining the airfield
access systems, the CCTV (closed circuit television) systems, and the
electronic badging systems. American Airlines Flight 77—one of the
planes hijacked on 9/11—takes off from Dulles.
Directors
Include Bush Family Member - Marvin P. Bush, the youngest brother of
future President George W. Bush, is a director at Stratesec from 1993
to June 2000, when most of its work on these big projects is done.
Wirt D. Walker III, a distant relative of George W. Bush, is chairman
of the board at Stratesec from 1992, and its CEO from 1999 until
January 2002. Another of Stratesec’s directors, from 1991 to 2001,
is Mishal Yousef Saud Al Sabah, who is a member of the Kuwaiti royal
family. Al Sabah is also chairman of an investment company called the
Kuwait-American Corporation (KuwAm), which, between 1993 and 1999,
holds a large, often controlling share of Stratesec. In 1996, it owns
90 percent of the company; by 1999 it owns 47 percent.
Other
Interests - Walker and Al Sabah are also co-investors in two
inter-related aviation companies: Aviation General and Commander
Aircraft. According to a 2005 report by freelance journalist Margie
Burns: “Aviation General boasted of its international clientele. A
1996 press release announced its sale of airplanes to the National
Civil Aviation Training Organization (NCATO) of Giza, Egypt, ‘the
sole civilian pilot training organization in Egypt.’ The
announcement mentions Al Sabah as chairman of KuwAm and board member
of Commander Aircraft Company.” NCATO also has contractual
partnerships with several US flight schools, including Embry-Riddle
University in Florida.
Connections
with Foreign Company a Delicate Matter - According to Wayne Black,
the head of a Florida-based security firm, it is delicate for a
security company serving international facilities to be so
interlinked with a foreign-owned company. He suggests, “Somebody
knew somebody.” Black also points out that when a company has a
security contract, “you know the inner workings of everything.”
Furthermore, if another company is linked to the security company,
then “what’s on your computer is on their computer.” After 9/11
Stratesec CEO Barry McDaniel will be asked whether FBI or other
agents have questioned him or others at Stratesec about their
security work related to 9/11. He answers, “No.” [American
Reporter, 1/20/2003; Prince George's Journal, 2/4/2003; Progressive
Populist, 3/1/2003; Progressive Populist, 4/15/2003; Washington
Spectator, 2/15/2005] Other companies involved with the security
overhaul during this time include Ensec Inc., which is in charge of
creating a new parking access control system, E-J Electric
Installation Co., and Electronic Systems Associates, a division of
Syska Hennessy. [Access Control & Security Systems, 7/1/1997; CEE
News, 1/1/2001; CEE News, 10/1/2001; Building Design and
Construction, 7/1/2002]
New
York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani opens a $13 million emergency
command center on the 23rd floor of World Trade Center Building 7.
[Newsday, 9/12/2001] The center is intended to coordinate responses
to various emergencies, including natural disasters like hurricanes
or floods, and terrorist attacks. The 50,000 square foot center has
reinforced, bulletproof, and bomb-resistant walls, its own air supply
and water tank, beds, showers to accommodate 30 people, and three
backup generators. It also has rooms full of video monitors from
where the mayor can oversee police and fire department responses. It
is to be staffed around the clock and is intended as a meeting place
for city leaders in the event of an act of terrorism. [CNN, 6/7/1999;
London Times, 9/12/2001; Glanz and Lipton, 2004, pp. 233] The center
is ridiculed as “Rudy’s bunker.” [Time, 12/22/2001] Author
Philip Shenon will later comment that it “seemed the supreme
example of how Giuliani’s ego and arrogance knew no bounds after
four years in office,” and: “WABC Radio mocked Giuliani with a
name-that-bunker contest for its listeners. Among the most popular
entries: ‘Rudy’s Nuclear Winter Palace’ and ‘The Nut Shell.’”
It is criticized because of the cost and because of the location,
next to the WTC towers, one of the city’s top terrorist targets. In
addition, the high floor it is on means it is vulnerable to power,
water, and elevator outages. [Shenon, 2008, pp. 346-347] Most
controversial is the 6,000-gallon fuel tank. In 1998 and 1999, Fire
Department officials warn that the fuel tank violates city fire codes
and poses a hazard.
During
a review of security procedures, Charlie Schnabolk, a security
consultant who wrote a secret report in 1985 about the security of
the World Trade Center (see July 1985), is asked what are the
greatest terrorist dangers to the WTC? He replies, “Someone blowing
up the PATH tubes from New Jersey,” and “someone flying a plane
into the building.” Further details, such as who is conducting the
security review and who Schnabolk gives his warning to, are
unreported. [UExpress (.com), 10/12/2001]
A
property risk assessment report is prepared for
Silverstein Properties before it acquires the lease for the World
Trade Center (see July 24, 2001). It identifies the scenario of an
aircraft hitting one of the WTC towers as one of the “maximum
foreseeable losses.” The report says, “This scenario is within
the realm of the possible, but highly unlikely.” Further details of
the assessment, such as who prepared it, are unreported. [National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 5/2003, pp. 16 ; Barrett and
Collins, 2006, pp. 189; American Prospect, 9/1/2006]
WAKE
UP AMERICA!!!....Its "OUR" country!!!
Love
"Light" and Energy
_Don
In
sum, I would affirm in this case because the Port Authority's failure
to implement discrete and basic security measures in the public
parking area of the commercial building complex arose from the
exercise of its proprietary -- rather than governmental –
obligations